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Aikin and Casey are continuing the development of fallacy theory in two ways 
frequently encountered in recent developments: They identify schemes not 
recognized before and they argue that some schemes may have instances which are 
not fallacious. Thus beside the familiar straw man, they identify the weak man and 
the hollow man. They regard these two patterns together with the standard view of 
the straw man appeal, which they call the representational view, as all varieties of a 
single argumentation scheme. All three, they claim, can have non-fallacious 
instances. To establish this, they ask us to consider instances. For the traditional 
straw man, they cite the following: 
 
(1) Music teacher to student: you need to work on your intonation. At the 
moment it sounds like a tortured cat. 
 
No doubt, the teacher is using exaggeration to make her point, and the traditional 
straw man may similarly use exaggeration to distort an argument. No doubt the 
teacher’s exaggeration may have positive pedagogical effect. But I am not convinced 
that her statement is a non-fallacious instance of the traditional straw man. The 
student has not presented an argument through her intonation. By contrast, the 
traditional straw man attacks a misrepresentation of an argument. 
 I am also not convinced that the example to show there are non-fallacious 
instances of the weak man appeal makes its point. Brad and Angelina admit that 
there are various arguments against gay marriage. One is considered: 
 
 
(2) If homosexuals are allowed to marry, then nothing would prevent 
the proponent of this argument to marry his box turtle. 
 
Now this argument has to be fleshed out, for in itself we have just a conditional 
statement.  But surely the proponent expects his audience to agree that marrying 
one’s box turtle is absurd and to infer from that statement and the conditional that 
gay marriage should not be legalized. Now there is nothing fallacious in pointing out 
that the conditional is unacceptable. Indeed making that judgment is part of 
argument evaluation. But I do not see that Brad or Angelina have inferred  that the 
ridiculousness of this argument means that all arguments for gay marriage are 
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ridiculous. Yet for weak man, the refutation of one bad argument is taken to mean 
that all additional arguments or reasons are bad. 
 Turning to the hollow man argument, remember that to use this appeal, “one 
invents an entirely fictitious and decisively silly position, attributes it to a  
purportedly real but vaguely defined opponent, knocks it down, and therefore 
suggests the opposition isn’t worthy of rational discussion.” Aikin and Casey point 
out that introductory logic texts are full of examples of arguments so fallacious as to 
be silly. But it is not obvious that these examples are put forward to suggest that 
some opposition is not worthy of serious consideration. Indeed, they are put 
forward to illustrate a pattern of bad reasoning and to facilitate its recognition. But 
then how are these textbook examples instances of the hollow man appeal? Aikin 
and Casey have built discrediting the opposition into the very definition of the 
pattern for which they are intending to present non-fallacious instances through 
indicating textbook examples of fallacies. 
 After discussing three varieties of the straw man appeal, Aikin and Casey 
turn to iron man arguments, which they regard as a related class. Such arguments 
involve “a charitable distortion to present an unserious arguer as serious.” Here 
again, I have trouble seeing how their examples fit this definition. In the first, Leslie 
Stahl has asked Eric Cantor to explain how Reagan’s raising taxes is compatible with 
the current Republican view never to raise taxes. Cantor has replied that Reagan 
never raised taxes and his spokesperson claimed that Stahl did not have her facts 
right. The blogger Jim Hoft points out that the overall tax rate went down during 
Reagan’s presidency. How does this show that either Cantor or his spokesperson 
were unserious and Hoft was trying to portray then as serious? Cantor and his 
spokesperson may have been factually incorrect, but how does Holft’s presenting 
facts which will put Reagan’s tax cuts in a very different light rehabilitate them as 
serious? In the Westboro Baptist Church example, how does Priscilla’s suggestion 
that these extremists may nonetheless have a legitimate point distort their position 
or relieve us of not having to discuss their particular arguments or evaluate their 
egregious behavior? In the case of Philosophy Student I, how does a professor’s 
suggesting the student’s view makes a suggestion which he may not have intended 
but which could improve his argument if developed distort the student’s view to 
make him seem a serious arguer when he was not serious? With Philosophy Student 
II, no reply by the professor is reported. So how has there been distortion of any off 
the wall view to make the student seem serious? 
 If the instructor took Philosophy student II’s view seriously and spent much 
time with it, the instructor might not be making good use of class time. In that case, 
“iron manning” would have unwarranted practical consequences. If someone added 
a point which might improve our view of one participant’s discussion and tend to 
make us suspicious of another’s position, is that necessarily a bad thing? Does that 
necessarily mean taking a view over-seriously? If trolls are uninformed and 
contribute with “unhinged criticism,” it may be wise not to take them seriously, not 
to feed the trolls. But except possibly with Philosophy student II, where there is no 
reply, I do not see that these examples of iron manning involve feeding the trolls. 
One can certainly agree with Aikin and Casey’s final summation that “sometimes 
feeding the trolls is (a) a waste of time and energy, and (b) it ultimately isn’t 
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anything but bad for the way we argue,” but I do not see that their examples 
illustrate feeding trolls. More seriously, how have they shown that iron manning 
invites argumentation which fails to have acceptable premises or adequate, i.e. 
relevant and sufficiently strong, connections between premises and the conclusion? 
But perhaps these are the wrong questions to ask. If iron man arguments involve the 
mistake of including arguments deserving exclusion, as Aikin and Casey conclude, 
does not the problem then constitute not a logical but rather a dialectical fallacy? 
This opens up a whole new question for Aikin and Casey’s investigation: How do the 
fallacious instances of straw man, weak man, hollow man, and iron man violate 
dialectical rules, e.g. pragma-dialectical rules, of procedure in argumentative 
situations? I commend this question to them. 
